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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER : FAILING TO ESTABLISH A
STANDARD FOR THE FUTURE
LINDSAY GOLDBERG*
In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court of the United
States considered whether the District of Columbia violated the Sec-
ond Amendment of the United States Constitution by prohibiting re-
sidents from possessing usable handguns in their homes.2  The Court
held that the ban on handgun possession and the prohibition on op-
erable firearm possession in the home violated the Second Amend-
ment.3  In so holding, the Court failed to specify strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for regulations challenged under the
Second Amendment and failed to effectively respond to Justice
Breyer’s interest-balancing approach.4  Had the Court properly ap-
plied a strict scrutiny standard to the statutes at hand, it likely could
have reached the same outcome and eliminated much of the uncer-
tainty that resulted from both the majority and dissenting opinions.5
I. THE CASE
Historically, the District of Columbia (“District”) generally pro-
hibited possession of handguns.6  Six residents of the District, wishing
to possess either a handgun or another prohibited firearm in their
homes for self-defense, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, asking the court to permanently enjoin
Copyright  2009 by Lindsay Goldberg.
* Lindsay Goldberg is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author would like to
thank Professor Jana Singer and her Notes & Comments Editors for their guidance, in-
sight, and support.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. Id. at 2787–88.  The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821–22.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
889
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various sections of the District’s Code.7  Specifically, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that section 7-2502.02(a)(4),8 barring handgun registration, sec-
tion 7-2507.02,9 barring possession of loaded or assembled firearms
within the home, and section 22-4504(a),10 forbidding the unlicensed
carrying of handguns within the home, violated the Second Amend-
ment.11  These sections of the District’s Code violated the Second
Amendment, the plaintiffs argued, because they interfered with the
Amendment’s establishment of a fundamental, individual right to
bear arms.12
After examining United States v. Miller,13 the last case in which the
Supreme Court of the United States considered a direct Second
Amendment challenge, and various federal appellate court decisions,
the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.14  Reasoning that
Miller rejected an individual right to bear arms distinct from militia
use and that none of the plaintiffs asserted membership in a militia,
the district court ruled that the plaintiffs had no viable claim.15
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.16  First, the court de-
cided that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
7. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 103–04 (D.D.C. 2004).  Only
one of the residents, Dick Heller, had actually applied for a permit to possess a handgun
and had been rejected. Id. at 103.
8. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001) (“A registration certificate shall not be issued
for a . . . [p]istol not validly registered to the current registrant in the District prior to
September 24, 1976, except that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any organi-
zation that employs at least 1 commissioned special police officer or other employee li-
censed to carry a firearm and that arms the employee with a firearm during the employee’s
duty hours or to a police officer who has retired from the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment.”), held unconstitutional by Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783.
9. D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001) (“Except for law enforcement personnel described
in § 7-2502.01(b)(1), each registrant shall keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless such firearm is kept at his
place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District of
Columbia.”), held unconstitutional by Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783.
10. D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) (2001) (“No person shall carry within the District of Co-
lumbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license
issued pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of
being so concealed.”).
11. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 103–04.
12. Id.
13. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
14. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 104–09.
15. Id. at 109.
16. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Before revers-
ing, the court concluded that special police officer Dick Heller had standing to bring suit
because he had applied for a handgun permit and had been rejected. Id. at 376, 378.
According to the Supreme Court, the appellate court did not invalidate the licensing re-
quirement, but held only that the District of Columbia could “‘not prevent [a handgun]
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keep and bear arms, based on the specific words of the Amendment,
placement of the Amendment in the Bill of Rights, and the historical
setting at the time of the drafting.17  In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that although no “unequivocal precedent” dictated the
outcome of the case, Miller was instructive.18  Because Miller implicitly
assumed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right,
the appellate court concluded that an individual’s enjoyment of the
right is not contingent upon enrollment in a militia.19
Second, the appellate court rejected the argument that the Dis-
trict is not subject to the Second Amendment because it is a purely
federal entity.20  The court explained that the Supreme Court “has
unambiguously held that the Constitution and Bill of Rights are in
effect in the District,” and that the fact that the District militia is not a
state militia is insignificant for purposes of the Second Amendment.21
Third, the appellate court rejected the argument that even if the
Second Amendment protects an individual right and is in effect in the
District, it does not bar the District’s regulations.22  The court con-
cluded that not only does the Second Amendment cover possession of
handguns, but also that the District’s restrictions are unreasonable
and therefore barred by the Second Amendment.23  The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the District’s prohibi-
tion on the possession of usable handguns in the home violated the
Second Amendment.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Courts apply various standards of review when evaluating the con-
stitutionality of a regulation, depending on the constitutional right
that the regulation is alleged to have violated.  Throughout the past
from being moved throughout one’s house.’”  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783, 2819 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Parker, 478 F.3d at 400).
17. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381–91.
18. Id. at 391.
19. Id. at 392, 395.  The District of Columbia Circuit explained that the Supreme Court
in Miller implicitly assumed the individual rights position by adopting the logic of the gov-
ernment’s secondary argument, that certain firearms are not within the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment, rather than the government’s primary argument, that the right secured
by the Second Amendment does not extend to private purposes. Id. at 392–93.
20. Id. at 395.
21. Id. at 395–96.
22. Id. at 397.
23. Id. at 397, 399–401.  The court admitted that the protections of the Second Amend-
ment are subject to reasonable restrictions, as the right to keep and bear arms was subject
to restrictions at common law. Id. at 399.
24. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787–88 (2008).
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century, the Supreme Court has usually applied either a strict scrutiny,
a rational basis, or an intermediate standard when evaluating chal-
lenged regulations.25  While the Supreme Court had not had the op-
portunity to apply a specific standard of review to Second Amendment
challenges until Heller, lower courts have typically applied standards
resembling either strict scrutiny or rational basis review to such
disputes.26
A. The Supreme Court Applies Various Standards of Review to Statutes
Challenged on Constitutional Grounds
When a government-imposed regulation allegedly violates a con-
stitutional right, the Supreme Court applies one of several standards
of review to determine the constitutionality of the regulation.  The
Court traditionally applies a strict scrutiny standard to regulations in-
volving suspect classifications or fundamental rights,27 a rational basis
standard to economic regulations or where deference to the legisla-
ture is warranted,28 and an intermediate standard to regulations that
allegedly violate equal protection, the First Amendment, or privacy
rights.29
1. Strict Scrutiny Review
When the Court evaluates a regulation under a strict scrutiny
standard, the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest in order to survive.”30  Although the Court
mentioned the term strict scrutiny and applied the standard as early as
1942,31 the Court took several decades to refine the standard by apply-
ing it in cases concerning suspect class discrimination under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments; freedom of speech, religion, and asso-
ciation under the First Amendment; and other fundamental rights.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part II.A.1.
28. See infra Part II.A.2.
29. See infra Part II.A.3.
30. E.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997).
31. See Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (explaining that
although deference was due Oklahoma’s legislature, the legislation involved one of the
basic civil rights of man and thus needed to be subjected to a strict scrutiny standard of
review).  A few years earlier, the Court hinted at some of the rights that it would consider
under this heightened scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of consti-
tutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”).
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In 1944, in Korematsu v. United States,32 the Court applied a height-
ened standard of review to a racial discrimination case.33  The Court
explained that the “most rigid scrutiny” was appropriate in such cases
because “restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect.”34  Despite application of this rigid
scrutiny, the Court held that a military order issued during World War
II that excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated mili-
tary areas was justified because of a “[p]ressing public necessity.”35
Two decades later, in McLaughlin v. Florida,36 the Court invali-
dated as unconstitutional a Florida statute that punished “‘[a]ny ne-
gro man and white woman, or any white man and negro woman’” who
habitually occupied the same room at nighttime.37  The Court ex-
plained that even though there was a valid state interest, the statute
was only constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment if it was
“necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment
of a permissible state policy.”38
Twenty years after McLaughlin, the Court further clarified this
heightened standard of review when it decided Palmore v. Sidoti,39 ex-
plaining that a racial classification must be “justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplish-
ment’” of that interest.40  In Palmore, the Court decided that the
state’s duty to grant custody based on the best interests of the child
did not support removing a child from its mother’s custody, even
though she had just remarried a person of another race.41  The Court
reasoned that the substantial government interest was insufficient to
justify the racial classification, and therefore invalidated the state stat-
ute in question.42  This strict scrutiny standard persists today in racial
classification cases, requiring that the government have a compelling
32. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
33. Id. at 216.
34. Id.; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“Classifications based solely
upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions
and hence constitutionally suspect.”).
35. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–19, 223–24.
36. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
37. Id. at 184, 196 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 798.05, repealed by Fla. Laws 1969, c. 69–195,
§ 1).
38. Id. at 196.  The McLaughlin Court purported to apply the “‘most rigid scrutiny’” as
it had done in Korematsu. Id. at 192 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216).
39. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
40. Id. at 432–33 (alteration in original) (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196).
41. Id. at 430, 433.
42. Id. at 433–34.
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interest and that the classification be narrowly tailored to promote
that interest.43
While the strict scrutiny standard was evolving in suspect class dis-
crimination cases, it also began to appear in cases involving First
Amendment rights.44  For example, in 1943, in Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania,45 the Court reversed petitioners’ convictions under an ordi-
nance that burdened petitioners’ freedoms of press and religion
because the ordinance was not “narrowly drawn.”46  More recently,
with respect to freedom of speech, the Court has clarified that if a
regulation restricts speech based on its content, it must satisfy strict
scrutiny.47  Thus, the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling [g]overnment interest,”48 and if a less restrictive
alternative is available, the legislature must use it.49  For example, in
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,50 the Court held a stat-
ute unconstitutional because requiring certain cable operators to fully
scramble or block certain channels during particular hours of the day
was not the least restrictive alternative.51
Regulations targeting the free exercise of religion also require a
compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring.52  In Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,53 because the Court de-
cided that the ordinances purportedly enacted to address religious
43. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“[A]ll racial classifications im-
posed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.  This
means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to fur-
ther compelling governmental interests.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (imposing a
strict scrutiny standard for race-based legislation).
44. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
45. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
46. Id. at 117.
47. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
48. Id. (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
49. Id.
50. 529 U.S. 803.
51. Id. at 806–07.  Instead, the Court recognized, a regime where viewers could request
that the channels be blocked on a household-by-household basis would just as effectively
prevent children from watching channels that were primarily dedicated to sexually-ori-
ented programming. Id. at 807.
52. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) (stating that “if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation,” the law must be “justified by a compelling interest”
and must be “narrowly tailored to advance that interest”).
53. 508 U.S. 520.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR405.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-JUN-09 10:38
2009] DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 895
animal sacrifices were actually intended to suppress the central ele-
ment of the Santeria religion, the Court invalidated the ordinances
under the “most rigorous of scrutiny.”54  Although there are excep-
tions to this standard in cases involving generally applicable laws that
only have the effect of burdening religious practices,55 the Court has
recently reiterated the “compelling interest test” as applied to the fed-
eral government.56
Likewise, in one of its earliest cases addressing the issue, the
Court emphasized in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson57 that the in-
terest of the state must be compelling to justify a deterrent effect on
the free exercise of the right of association.58  As a result, when the
State of Alabama tried to obtain membership lists from the NAACP to
determine whether it was conducting intrastate business in violation
of an Alabama statute, the Court invalidated the state action under
“the closest scrutiny.”59  A few years later, the Court clarified its ap-
proach and stated that before performing an investigation that would
intrude on the rights of speech, press, association, and petition, the
state would have to “convincingly show a substantial relation between
the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling
state interest.”60
In addition to rights under the First Amendment, other funda-
mental rights are also subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
For example, the Court has deemed the right to vote fundamental
54. Id. at 527, 534, 546.  Specifically, the Court invalidated the ordinances because the
proffered objectives were not compelling and could have been achieved by narrower ordi-
nances that burdened the religion less severely. Id. at 546–47.
55. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990); see
also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988) (explain-
ing that past cases “cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs . . . re-
quire government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful
actions”).  As a result of Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, to restore the compelling interest test as originally set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 515 (1997).
However, the Court held the Act unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress never had
the power to enact it. Id. at 511.
56. See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006) (concluding that the lower courts did not err in requiring that the government
demonstrate a compelling interest before barring the use of a particular drug in religious
ceremonies).
57. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
58. Id. at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
59. Id. at 460–61, 464.  The Court found that Alabama fell “short of showing a control-
ling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate,
which disclosure of the membership lists [wa]s likely to have.” Id. at 466.
60. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
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because the right is “ ‘preservative of all rights.’”61  Thus, in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,62 Virginia’s poll tax needed to be “closely
scrutinized” to determine its constitutionality.63  In Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15,64 the Court further explained that a New
York statute, which limited voting in certain school district elections to
property owners or parents of children enrolled in district schools,
needed to be “‘meticulously scrutinized’”65 to see if it was “necessary
to promote a compelling state interest.”66
The Court has also determined that statutory provisions invoking
the “fundamental right of interstate movement” must be adjudicated
by the stricter “compelling state interest” standard.67  The Court has
deemed other rights fundamental as well, such as the right of access to
the courts,68 and has reiterated that the Constitution limits a state’s
right to interfere with certain personal decisions about family and
parenthood.69
2. Rational Basis Review
Under a rational basis standard, the Supreme Court upholds a
challenged regulation if it has a “rational relationship” to a “legitimate
governmental purpose.”70  Courts accord regulations this strong pre-
sumption of validity when a regulation is made in an area “neither
involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines,” as
61. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
62. 383 U.S. 663.
63. Id. at 670.
64. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
65. Id. at 622, 626 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
66. Id. at 627.
67. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (emphasis omitted).  Although the
Court did not emphasize the narrowly tailored element of strict scrutiny, it stated that
none of the classifications was tailored to serve the government’s objective. Id. at 631.
Recently, however, the Court has explained that two of the components contained in the
right to travel are embedded in the Constitution, which also may explain why a heightened
standard of review is applied to regulations allegedly violating that right. See Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 500–04 (1999) (explaining that the source of one of the components is
Article IV, and the source of another is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
68. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (referring to the right of access
to the courts as fundamental).
69. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (2002) (citing
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)) (noting that the Constitution
affords protection to “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education”); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (“[M]arriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very
existence and survival.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
70. E.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993).
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it is unnecessary to have the judiciary judge the wisdom of the
legislature.71
When regulations involve non-suspect classifications, the Court
uses a rational basis standard to determine whether the regulations
violate the Equal Protection Clause.72  For example, in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,73 the Court stated that because persons
with mental retardation are not a suspect class, regulations affecting
those persons only must be “rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose.”74  Similarly, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,75
the Court explained that when a regulation affects ordinary commer-
cial transactions, a court should not pronounce the regulation uncon-
stitutional unless the facts preclude the assumption that the
regulation “rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.”76  Courts consistently apply this rational
basis standard to economic regulations today, unless such regulations
violate a fundamental right or are drawn upon a suspect class distinc-
tion, because states are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of
their local economies under their police powers.77
3. Intermediate Review
When the Court evaluates a regulation under an intermediate
standard, the applicable test depends on whether the regulation vio-
lates equal protection, the First Amendment, or privacy rights.78  The
Court often applies this standard when it determines that a particular
category of regulations does not require a strict scrutiny review, but
warrants some other heightened standard.79
In Craig v. Boren,80 the Court stated that regulations that discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender “must serve important governmental
71. Id. at 319.
72. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2001) (explain-
ing that because the state court erred in deeming a classification to be suspect, rational
basis review was appropriate).
73. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
74. Id. at 466.
75. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
76. Id. at 152.
77. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“When local economic
regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consist-
ently defers to legislative determinations . . . .”).
78. See infra notes 80–96 and accompanying text.
79. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (explaining that a strict scrutiny
review was unnecessary); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (same).
80. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives” in order to withstand a challenge under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.81  In a later case, the
Court added that the party seeking to defend the government action
must also demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification for that
action.”82  The Court created this standard to simultaneously respond
to a history of sex discrimination and yet recognize the “[i]nherent
differences between women and men.”83
As articulated in United States v. O’Brien,84 the Court also uses an
intermediate standard of review to evaluate content-neutral restric-
tions on the freedom of speech.85  If a regulation is content-neutral, a
court will sustain it under the First Amendment if it “advances impor-
tant governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free
speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary
to further those interests.”86  The Court uses a similar test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations: Assum-
ing the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading (and
thus is covered by the First Amendment), a regulation must assert a
substantial governmental interest, directly advance such interest, and
not be more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.87
Some election regulations also fall under a standard more “flexi-
ble” than strict scrutiny because the Court recognizes that states retain
the power to regulate their own elections.88  In Burdick v. Takushi,89
the Court articulated that if a regulation imposes a “severe” restriction
on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, “the regulation must be
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance”;
81. Id. at 197.
82. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
83. Id. at 531, 533 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
85. Id. at 377; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
86. Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 189 (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); see also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989) (explaining that a “regulation of the
time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the govern-
ment’s legitimate, content-neutral interests,” which is satisfied if the regulation “promotes
a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (explaining that a four-part test has emerged in commercial speech cases); see
also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002) (explaining that Central
Hudson “provides an adequate basis for decision” in commercial speech cases (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
88. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992).
89. 504 U.S. 428.
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however, if the regulation imposes only “reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory restrictions” on those rights, “the State’s important regulatory in-
terests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.”90
Last, although the Court likely concluded in Roe v. Wade91 that
the right to an abortion is fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny,92
the Court has more recently decided that only regulations that impose
an “undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision” violate
the right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.93  Although it is unclear whether the Court changed the
standard because it no longer deemed the right to an abortion funda-
mental94 or because the strict scrutiny standard undervalued states’
interest in a potential life,95 it appears that the new standard is not as
rigid as the old one.96
B. Lower Courts Apply Several Different Standards of Review to Statutes
Challenged Under the Second Amendment
Because the Supreme Court has never explicitly established the
standard of review that courts should apply to challenges under the
Second Amendment,97 federal appellate and state courts have applied
various standards to determine the constitutionality of such
regulations.98
1. Federal Appellate Courts Apply Various Standards of Review
Federal appellate courts that have found that the Second Amend-
ment protects a collective right have applied a rational basis standard
of review, while federal appellate courts that have found that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects an individual right have applied a height-
90. Id. at 434 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. See id. at 155 (explaining that where fundamental rights are involved, regulations
must be narrowly drawn to a compelling state interest).
93. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
94. See id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that the majority must have made such a determination).
95. See id. at 873 (majority opinion) (arguing that Roe’s trimester framework “miscon-
ceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest[ ] and in practice it undervalues the
States’ interest in potential life”).
96. See id. (explaining that the previous trimester framework should be abandoned “as
a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life”).
97. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Only in [Miller]
has the Supreme Court rendered any holding respecting the Second Amendment as ap-
plied to the federal government.”); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)
(explaining that the Second Amendment could not be said to protect the right to keep
and bear the particular shotgun involved).
98. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
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ened standard of review.  For example, in Silveira v. Lockyer,99 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
Second Amendment does not provide an individual right to own or
possess guns or firearms.100  On this basis, the court held that the Sec-
ond Amendment does not limit California’s ability to regulate the pos-
session or use of firearms, including assault weapons, and that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a claim under the Second Amend-
ment.101  When evaluating plaintiffs’ claim under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, based on their claim that
California’s restrictions on assault weapons contained exceptions only
for certain classes of people, the court explained that it would not
apply a heightened scrutiny standard to the regulation, but rather a
rational basis standard.102
The Seventh Circuit took a similar approach in Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis,103 after concluding that a police officer had standing to
challenge a regulation that prohibited firearm possession by persons
convicted of domestic violence offenses.104  However, because the
court found that the right to keep and bear arms is a collective right,
the court dismissed Gillespie’s claim for failure to demonstrate a
“‘reasonable relationship’ between his own inability to carry a firearm
and ‘the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’”105
Then, like the Ninth Circuit in Silveira, the court stated that under the
Equal Protection Clause, the statute needed only to survive a rational
basis review because the right involved is not fundamental.106
Conversely, in United States v. Emerson,107 the Fifth Circuit held
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and
99. 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 1066.
101. Id. at 1087.
102. Id. at 1087–88.  Rather, the court concluded that the Second Amendment confers a
“collective right” to “bear arms, guarantee[ing] the right of the people to maintain effec-
tive state militias.” Id. at 1060 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 710.
105. Id. at 711 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).  The court’s
use of Miller, however, is misplaced. Miller used the “reasonable relationship” test to con-
clude that the Second Amendment does not protect a particular firearm, not to determine
whether the regulation would survive Second Amendment scrutiny. See Miller, 307 U.S. at
178 (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
106. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 709.
107. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
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bear arms, after concluding that its sister circuits misinterpreted Miller
and insufficiently examined the Second Amendment.108  Despite this
holding, the court decided that a regulation that prohibited the ap-
pellant from possessing a firearm because he was subject to a court
order did not violate the Second Amendment.109  The court reasoned
that the appellant’s Second Amendment right was properly subjected
to “limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions . . .
that [we]re reasonable and not inconsistent with the right [to keep
and bear arms].”110
In Parker v. District of Columbia,111 the District of Columbia Circuit
took a similar approach when it decided that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms.112  Although the
court did not specify the applicable standard of review, it noted that
the Second Amendment’s protection is subject to the same sort of
“reasonable restrictions” that limit the First Amendment.113
2. State Courts Apply a Deferential Standard of Review
State courts generally apply either a rational basis standard or a
similar reasonableness standard to regulations that allegedly violate
the Second Amendment.  For example, in Rohrbaugh v. State,114 the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered the constitu-
tionality of a statute that prohibited any person convicted of a felony
sexual offense from possessing a firearm.115  Despite holding that
both the West Virginia and United States Constitutions protect an in-
dividual right to keep and bear arms, the court ruled that the regula-
tion was a proper exercise of the legislature’s police power to impose
reasonable limitations on the right.116
A Wisconsin court reached a similar result in State v. Cole,117 al-
though in Cole the regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons was not challenged under the Second Amendment but
108. Id. at 227, 260; see also Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“Only the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the Second Amendment to protect an indi-
vidual right.”).
109. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 212–13, 264–65.
110. Id. at 261; see also United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d. 832, 835–36 (5th Cir. 2005)
(applying Emerson); United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2003)
(same).
111. 478 F.3d 370.
112. Id. at 395.
113. Id. at 399.
114. 607 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 2004).
115. Id. at 412 (citing W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7(b) (2000)).
116. Id. at 412–14.
117. 665 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 2003).
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under a similar provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.118  Despite
the fact that the Wisconsin Constitution protects a fundamental indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
declined to adopt a strict scrutiny standard of review, instead stating
that the correct test was whether the statute was a “reasonable regula-
tion in light of the state’s police powers.”119
In Ex parte Perez,120 the Court of Appeals of Texas used a different
approach to reach a similar result, concluding that the Second
Amendment does not provide an individual right to keep and bear
arms, and does not entitle the appellant, who had been charged with
unlawfully carrying a handgun, to relief.121  Thus, the court used a
rational basis standard to review a section of the Texas Penal Code
that prohibited the appellant from carrying a handgun, ruling that
the section did not violate the appellant’s substantive due process
rights.122
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that because the Second Amendment confers an individ-
ual right to keep and bear arms, the District’s ban on handgun posses-
sion and the prohibition on operable firearm possession in the home
violated the Second Amendment.123  Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia began by explaining the prefatory and operative clauses of the
Second Amendment.124  Looking at the operative clause first, the
Court explained that the phrase “right of the people” strongly indi-
cated an individual right because other constitutional provisions with
similar terminology “unambiguously refer[ed] to individual rights.”125
Additionally, the Court explained, the phrase “keep and bear arms”
118. Id. at 330.
119. Id. at 336–37 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Although the court
cautioned that this reasonableness test should not be mistaken for a rational basis test, as
the right involved required something more than a rational basis, this test is still a relatively
deferential type of review. Id. at 337–38.
120. No. 05-03-00363-CR, 2003 WL 21267247 (Tex. Ct. App. June 3, 2003).
121. Id. at *1, *3.
122. Id. at *1, *3, *4.
123. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814, 2821–22 (2008).
124. Id. at 2789–90.  Justice Scalia noted that the Court was guided by the principle that
the words and phrases in the Constitution are to be used in their “‘normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.’” Id. at 2788 (quoting United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)); see also supra note 2 (text of the Second Amendment).
125. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790.  The Court discussed the operative clause first because,
apart from its “clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of
the operative clause.” Id. at 2789.  Other constitutional provisions with similar terminology
are the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 2790.
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guaranteed the right to possess and carry weapons in cases of confron-
tation because the phrase was not limited to military use.126  The
Court observed that this meaning was consistent with the historical
background of the Second Amendment, which also explained the in-
clusion of a prefatory clause, and announced that the purpose of codi-
fying the right was “to prevent elimination of the militia.”127
The Court also considered whether precedent foreclosed the
conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right.128  Principally, the Court explained that the Second Amend-
ment was not implicated in Miller because the Second Amendment
did not extend to the particular weapon at issue, not because the de-
fendants were bearing arms for nonmilitary use.129  The Court then
concluded that Miller positively suggested that the Second Amend-
ment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.130  The Court
also explained that weapons within the meaning of the Second
Amendment are those that law-abiding citizens typically possess for
lawful purposes.131
Last, the Court conceded that the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms is not without limits and that certain prohibitions
on the possession of firearms are permissible.132  However, the Court
explained that the District’s restrictions imposed an “absolute prohibi-
tion of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home,” which
differed from the permissible restrictive laws found in the colonial pe-
riod.133  Thus, the Court invalidated section 7-2502.02(a)(4), barring
registration of handguns, and section 7-2507.02, barring possession of
loaded or assembled firearms within the home.134
126. Id. at 2797.
127. Id. at 2797, 2801.
128. Id. at 2812.
129. Id. at 2814.
130. Id.  This right, however, extends only to “arms that ‘have some reasonable relation-
ship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
131. Id. at 2815–16.  In other words, the weapons protected by the Second Amendment
are those “‘in common use at the time.’” Id. at 2817 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
132. Id. at 2816–17.  For example, the Court stated that nothing in the opinion “should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.” Id.
133. Id. at 2819–22.
134. Id. at 2821–22.  Because the appellate court upheld the licensing requirement and
the respondent indicated that licensing was not a main concern, the Supreme Court did
not address the requirement. Id. at 2819.
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Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the Second Amendment’s
text and history, coupled with the Court’s decision in Miller, make it
clear that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear
arms for military purposes only, and the Court should not interpret
the Amendment to limit Congress’s authority to regulate firearm use
or possession for non-military purposes.135
Justice Breyer separately dissented, arguing that “the Second
Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, inter-
ests.”136  However, Justice Breyer went a step further than Justice Ste-
vens, arguing in the alternative that even if the Second Amendment
protects an individual’s interest in self-defense, the District’s regula-
tions are permissible, reasonable responses to a “serious” problem.137
When evaluating a particular firearm regulation, Justice Breyer sug-
gested, the Court should use an interest-balancing inquiry under
which the Court would generally ask “whether the statute burdens a
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental inter-
ests.”138  Evaluating section 7-2502.02(a)(4) under this inquiry, Justice
Breyer would have found the regulation to be a proportional response
to compelling concerns.139
IV. ANALYSIS
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the District’s ban on handgun possession and the pro-
hibition on operable firearm possession in the home violated the Sec-
ond Amendment.140  In so holding, the Court failed to specify strict
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for regulations chal-
lenged under the Second Amendment and failed to effectively re-
spond to Justice Breyer’s proposed interest-balancing approach.141
Had the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the statutes at hand,
135. Id. at 2822–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined Justice Stevens’s dissent. Id. at 2822.
136. Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined
Justice Breyer’s dissent. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2852.
139. Id. at 2853–54, 2870.  Like the majority, Justice Breyer did not address the licensing
requirement. Id. at 2853.  Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer would not have addressed
section 7-2507.02, barring possession of loaded or assembled firearms within the home,
because he would have read a self-defense exception into the restriction. Id.
140. Id. at 2821–22 (majority opinion).
141. See infra Part IV.A.
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the Court could have reached the same outcome while providing
meaningful standards for lower courts and state legislatures.142
A. The Court Erred by Failing to Establish a Strict Scrutiny Standard
for Second Amendment Challenges and by Failing to Effectively
Address Justice Breyer’s Dissent
The Heller Court failed to provide an adequate justification for
not establishing a standard of review for regulations challenged under
the Second Amendment.  When Justice Breyer pointed out that the
majority had not established a standard, the Court criticized his inter-
est-balancing approach instead of explaining why it chose not to set a
standard.143  The Court then explained that it could not clarify the
field any more than it had because this case represented the “first in-
depth examination of the Second Amendment.”144  The Court should
have avoided this criticism by stating that the governing standard of
review was strict scrutiny, and it should have done so based on Justice
Scalia’s own language,145 federal appellate court decisions involving
the Second Amendment,146 and a careful analysis of Justice Breyer’s
dissent.147
1. The Court’s Language Implied that the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms Is Fundamental
According to one scholar, the Court has never precisely defined
what qualifies as a fundamental right.148  However, the Court has ex-
plained that a fundamental right is one that is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.”149  As previously discussed, the Court has classified as
fundamental the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, the right
of access to the courts, and the right to certain decisions pertaining to
the family and parenthood.150  Additionally, the Court has long con-
142. See infra Part IV.B.
143. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
144. Id.
145. See infra Part IV.A.1.
146. See infra Part IV.A.2.
147. See infra Part IV.A.3.
148. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 697
(2007).
149. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
150. See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text.
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sidered as fundamental the right to free speech, press, and
assembly.151
Although the Court in Heller did not clarify whether the right to
keep and bear arms is fundamental, its conclusion that the right is an
individual right supports the view that it is a fundamental one.  In
analyzing the historical background of the case, the Court stated that
“it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment,
like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”152
The Court later explained that this “inherent right of self-defense has
been central to the Second Amendment right.”153
Further, the Court recognized that as early as 1846, state courts
had construed the Amendment as protecting the “‘natural right of
self-defence,’” a right that the Georgia Supreme Court described as
“‘originally belonging to our forefathers, trampled under foot by
Charles I[ ] and his two wicked sons and successors, re-established by
the revolution of 1688, conveyed to this land of liberty by the colo-
nists, and finally incorporated conspicuously in our own Magna
Charta!’”154  The Heller Court also favorably cited the Georgia court’s
description of this right as being “‘necessary to the security of a free
State.’”155  The Court may not have explicitly stated that the right to
keep and bear arms is fundamental; however, by implying that this
right is deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition, and per-
haps even implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, it similarly im-
plied that the right is fundamental.
Additionally, when analyzing whether the historical background
confirms that this right is an individual one, the Court referenced Wil-
liam Blackstone’s works, explaining that Blackstone “cited the arms
provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of
Englishmen.”156  Commentators have similarly used this historical
background, including Blackstone’s works, to conclude that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects a fundamental right.157  Because the Heller
151. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
152. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
153. Id. at 2817.
154. Id. at 2809 (quoting Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)).
155. Id. (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251). The Court explained that Nunn “perfectly cap-
tured the way in which the operative clause of the Second Amendment furthers the pur-
pose announced in the prefatory clause, in continuity with the English right.” Id.
156. Id. at 2797–98 (citing 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 136, 139–40 (1765)).  The Court also mentioned that Blackstone’s works “‘con-
stituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.’” Id. at
2798 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)).
157. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Four-
teenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1, 58–59
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Court’s analysis implied that the right to keep and bear arms is funda-
mental, the Court should have required that any infringement on that
right be “‘narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’”158
2. Lower Courts Have Implied that a Strict Scrutiny Standard of
Review Is Appropriate for Second Amendment Challenges
As additional support for application of strict scrutiny to the regu-
lations at issue in Heller, the Court should have placed greater empha-
sis on the fact that the federal appellate circuits applying a rational
basis standard to firearm regulations did so only after concluding that
the Second Amendment does not protect an individual right to keep
and bear arms.159  Although the Court is not bound by these deci-
sions, both circuits that acknowledged an individual right either ex-
pressed or implied that a heightened standard of review should
apply.160  For example, although the Fifth Circuit did not mention the
terms “strict scrutiny” or “fundamental” in Emerson, and its standard
lacks the requirement of a “compelling governmental interest,” the
court’s language appears to require at least some heightened form of
scrutiny.161  Similarly, in Parker, by basing its standard on a case that
carved out certain instances where an intermediate standard would
apply to a right traditionally subject to strict scrutiny,162 the District of
(2007) (explaining that the Second Amendment satisfies the test of whether the right pro-
tected is fundamental, or in other words, “necessary to an Anglo-American regime of or-
dered liberty” (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Nelson Lund, D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard Ques-
tion?, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 229, 248–50 (2008) (stating that the Second Amend-
ment “protects the most fundamental of all natural rights” and is “deserving of robust
judicial enforcement”).
158. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flo-
res, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
159. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms only for the purpose
of maintaining an effective state militia, and that a rational basis standard would be applied
to challenges to regulations under the Amendment).
160. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the
Second Amendment’s protection is “subject to the same sort of reasonable restrictions”
that courts have recognized when interpreting the First Amendment, and explaining that
the government could “‘impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech’” under the First Amendment (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, subject to “limited,
narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases that are reasonable
and not inconsistent with the right [to keep and bear arms]”).
161. See Emerson, 270 F.3d. at 261 (explaining that the right could be subjected to lim-
ited, narrowly tailored exceptions); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
162. Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); see also supra notes 47,
84–86 and accompanying text (explaining that in the context of First Amendment cases,
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Columbia Circuit actually lent support to the argument that a height-
ened standard of review should apply.
Although state courts usually apply a rational basis or other defer-
ential standard to regulations allegedly violating the right to keep and
bear arms,163 regardless of whether the right is classified as individual
or collective, many of these cases deal with regulations that are inher-
ently different than the severe restrictions at issue in Heller.164  More
importantly, these cases do not necessarily imply that courts should
always apply a deferential standard.  For example, in Rohrbaugh v.
State,165 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia classified the
right to keep and bear arms as an individual right, yet said that the
regulation prohibiting any person convicted of a felony sexual offense
from possessing a firearm was a “reasonable” exercise of the West Vir-
ginia legislature’s police powers.166  However, the court clarified that
it had recently found this statute constitutional because the legisla-
ture’s method of achieving public safety had been “crafted nar-
rowly.”167  Although the court likely applied this standard out of
deference to the legislature, the court’s language implied that the reg-
ulation would have survived strict scrutiny as well, as narrow tailoring
is a component of strict scrutiny.168  Additionally, in State v. Cole,169
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied a deferential standard when
it classified the right to keep and bears arms as a fundamental, individ-
ual right, and said that the regulation prohibiting the carrying of con-
cealed weapons was “a reasonable regulation on the time, place, and
manner in which the right to bear arms may be exercised.”170  How-
ever, this standard is in keeping with First Amendment jurisprudence,
which subjects time, place, and manner restrictions to a review more
content-neutral restrictions are subject to an intermediate standard of review as opposed to
a strict scrutiny standard of review).
163. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2853 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (“[State courts with] experience in these matters have uniformly taken an approach
that treats empirically-based legislative judgment with a degree of deference.”).
164. See id. at 2818 (majority opinion) (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have come
close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”).
165. 607 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 2004).
166. Id. at 412–14.
167. Id. at 413 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
168. See id. at 412 (“[I]n considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment,
courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of
powers in government . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. 665 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 2003).
170. Id. at 339.
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deferential than strict scrutiny, but applies strict scrutiny to more re-
strictive regulations.171
Other state decisions that have applied a rational basis standard
to Second Amendment claims have been based on outdated prece-
dent.  In Ex parte Perez,172 for example, the Court of Appeals of Texas
reviewed a section of the Texas Penal Code under a rational basis stan-
dard, despite the appellant’s attempts to have the court reconsider the
applicable standard in light of Emerson.173  The court explained that it
was bound by United States v. Cruikshank,174 and held that the Second
Amendment “‘has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the
National Government.’”175  Additionally, because Texas courts had
previously cited Miller as “holding that the Second Amendment does
not grant a right to bear arms unrelated to a well-regulated militia,”
the court affirmed the trial court’s order.176  Because this court based
its rational basis standard on an interpretation of Miller that has since
been clarified, it and similar state cases are not instructive, despite
Justice Breyer’s claim to the contrary.177
Alternatively, even if all state cases supported a deferential stan-
dard of review, the Court appeared to explicitly rule out rational basis
scrutiny as an appropriate standard for regulations challenged under
the Second Amendment.178  Although the reasonableness standard
that many of the states advocate may be more strict than a rational
basis standard,179 both are relatively deferential standards that the
Court inferentially ruled out.
171. See supra notes 47, 84–86 and accompanying text (explaining that in the context of
First Amendment cases, content-neutral restrictions are subject to an intermediate stan-
dard of review as opposed to a strict scrutiny standard of review).
172. No. 05-03-00363-CR, 2003 WL 21267247 (Tex. Ct. App. June 3, 2003).
173. Id. at *2–*3.
174. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
175. Ex parte Perez, 2003 WL 21267247 at *1 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).  The
court contrasted this with Emerson, which did not address this issue because the defendant
was charged with violating a federal statute. Id. at *2 n.3.
176. Id. at *2, *4.
177. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2853 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that while not controlling, these state cases can be instructive).
178. See id. at 2817–18 n.27 (majority opinion) (explaining that a rational basis test
“could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate” the right to
keep and bear arms).
179. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 337–38 (Wis. 2003) (cautioning that the
reasonableness test “should not be mistaken for a rational basis test,” because the right
involved clearly requires something more than a rational basis, yet explaining that the
reasonableness test is still a relatively deferential standard of review).
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3. Justice Breyer’s Dissent Supports Application of Strict Scrutiny
As further support for applying a strict scrutiny standard of re-
view, the majority should have properly responded to Justice Breyer’s
dissent and explained why the cases he cited might have better sup-
ported application of strict scrutiny.180  Instead, the majority criticized
his approach and stated that it knew of no other enumerated constitu-
tional right that the Court had subjected to an interest-balancing
approach.181
The Court should have looked at the cases cited in support of
Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard and pointed out that most
carved out exceptions to a default strict scrutiny standard where the
courts decided that an intermediate standard was more appropri-
ate.182  For example, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,183 al-
though the Court did not extensively analyze why the standard of
review should be different in matters of commercial speech, the Court
relied exclusively on the Central Hudson test,184 where the Court iden-
tified “the common sense distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject
to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.”185  Thus, al-
though strict scrutiny applies generally to First Amendment chal-
lenges, it is unnecessary in instances involving commercial speech.186
Similarly, in Burdick v. Takushi,187 the Court applied a standard
more flexible than the default rule of strict scrutiny to certain election
180. See infra notes 182–189 and accompanying text.
181. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
182. In addition to cases that carved out an exception to a default strict scrutiny stan-
dard, Justice Breyer also referenced United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996),
where an intermediate standard was applied to a gender classification. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at
2853.  However, even if this exception was not carved out of a default strict scrutiny stan-
dard, gender classifications are unique, as the Court recognized the “‘[i]nherent differ-
ences’” between women and men. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
183. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
184. See id. at 367–68 (explaining that Central Hudson “provides an adequate basis for
decision” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
185. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See id. at 562–63 (explaining that because of the inherent distinction, the Constitu-
tion “accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guar-
anteed expression”); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)
(explaining that an intermediate standard would be applied to content-neutral restrictions
on the freedom of speech).  Although Thompson did not label the approach as an interme-
diate standard of review, the test was taken directly from Central Hudson, where the concur-
rence labeled it as an intermediate standard of review. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.,
447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“I agree with the Court that this level of inter-
mediate scrutiny is appropriate . . . .”); see also supra note 184.
187. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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regulations because the Court recognized that states retain the power
to regulate their own elections.188  To subject all regulations to strict
scrutiny, including regulations concerning the structure of the elec-
tion, “would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are
operated equitably and efficiently.”189  By citing cases where the Court
carved out exceptions to a strict scrutiny standard, Justice Breyer more
persuasively made a case for application of a strict scrutiny standard
for most Second Amendment claims, with allowances for exceptions
where a more deferential standard is appropriate.190
B. The Majority Did Not Implicitly Reject Strict Scrutiny and the Court
Could Have Reached the Same Result by Applying a Strict
Scrutiny Standard
Although the Court did not express that a strict scrutiny standard
should apply to regulations challenged under the Second Amend-
ment, it did not expressly or implicitly reject a strict scrutiny standard,
despite Justice Breyer’s argument to the contrary.191  Further, al-
though strict scrutiny is not always “strict in theory and fatal in fact,”192
meaning that strict scrutiny is not always an impossible standard to
meet, in this case the Court could have reached the same result and
invalidated the District’s statutes.193
1. The Majority Did Not Implicitly Reject a Strict Scrutiny Standard
and It Is Not an Impossible Standard to Meet
According to Justice Breyer, the majority implicitly rejected a
strict scrutiny standard by “approving” laws that prohibit concealed
weapons and firearms in certain locales, deny criminals their Second
Amendment right, and regulate commercial firearm sales.194  In mak-
ing this assertion, Justice Breyer assumed that these prohibitions
188. Id. at 433–34.  The Constitution provides that states may prescribe “[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”  U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
189. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
190. Although Justice Breyer may not have wanted to make this argument because he
sought to uphold the regulations, the majority could nonetheless have noted this argu-
ment in support of a strict scrutiny standard. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783, 2870 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the District’s measures were a pro-
portionate response).
191. See infra Part IV.B.1.
192. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
193. See infra Part IV.B.2.
194. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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would not pass a strict scrutiny standard.195  However, a review of post-
Emerson Fifth Circuit decisions clarifies that regulations can pass such
a heightened standard of review.  In United States v. Darrington,196 for
example, the court held constitutional a statute making it an offense
to be a felon in possession of a firearm, even though it applied Emer-
son’s standard.197  Similarly, in United States v. Patterson,198 the court
held constitutional a statute making it an offense to be an unlawful
user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm, stating that
this conclusion was consistent with the Second Amendment right as
construed in Emerson.199
Even if the standard in Emerson is less rigid than a true strict scru-
tiny standard, as it lacks the compelling governmental interest re-
quirement, Justice Breyer explained in his dissent that the Court has
already deemed compelling “‘concern for the safety and . . . lives of its
citizens’” and “‘interest in preventing crime.’”200  Therefore, even if
the Fifth Circuit had required a compelling governmental interest in
addition to its limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions, it is likely
that the statutes in the above Fifth Circuit cases would have met this
standard.201
Further, the Court has rejected the notion that a strict scrutiny
standard is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”202  When a federal high-
way program was challenged for incentivizing general contractors to
hire subcontractors controlled by “disadvantaged individuals,” the
Court explained that “when race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, [that] action is within constitutional constraints if
it satisfies the narrow tailoring test.”203  Additionally, a recent empiri-
cal study conducted by Professor Adam Winkler, analyzing each strict
scrutiny decision published by all federal courts between 1990 and
2003, concluded that a strict scrutiny standard was “far from the inevi-
195. See id. (stating that the constitutionality of these prohibitions would be “far from
clear” under a strict scrutiny standard).
196. 351 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2003).
197. Id. at 633–34.  In fact, the Court cited Emerson as recognizing that “‘felons, infants
and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms,’” as those
prohibitions fall within permissible “‘limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions.’” Id. at
635 (quoting United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001)).
198. 431 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2005).
199. Id. at 835–36.
200. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 755
(1987)).
201. See id. (“[T]he Court has in a wide variety of constitutional contexts found such
public-safety concerns sufficiently forceful to justify restrictions on individual liberties.”).
202. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. at 204, 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tably deadly test imagined” by many.204  In fact, he concluded that
thirty percent of all strict scrutiny analyses resulted in the court up-
holding the challenged law.205
2. The Court Likely Could Have Reached the Same Result in Heller
Applying a Strict Scrutiny Standard
Even though a strict scrutiny standard is not always “strict in the-
ory and fatal in fact,” had the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard
to the two remaining challenged District statutes, barring registration
of handguns and possession of loaded or assembled firearms within
the home, it likely would still have invalidated both statutes.
In addressing the statute barring registration of handguns, which
completely banned from the home extraordinarily popular firearms,
the Court stated that the ban would fail constitutional muster under
any standard of review that it has applied to enumerated constitu-
tional rights.206  Although the Court did not make a similar statement
with respect to the statute that required all firearms in the home to be
kept inoperable, the Court seemed to indicate that the statute was not
narrowly tailored.207  Had the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard,
it likely could have reached the same result without depriving the
lower courts of a meaningful way to determine whether a particular
firearm regulation is consistent with the Second Amendment.208  Ad-
ditionally, under such an approach, the Court could have later carved
out exceptions to the strict scrutiny standard if it determined that
there were instances in which a more deferential standard would be
appropriate.209
204. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006).
205. Id. at 796.
206. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817–18 (majority opinion).  The Court then conceded that the
statute would survive rational basis review; however, it claimed that a rational basis standard
would not be used to evaluate a “specific, enumerated right.” Id. at 2817–18 n.27.
207. See id. at 2818 (“This [statute] makes it impossible for citizens to use the[ ] [fire-
arms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.”).
208. See id. at 2850–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asking several process-based questions as
a result of the majority’s opinion).  Although one can argue that other courts would not be
faced with this situation because Heller involved the District, some commentators have ar-
gued that “‘there would be no analytical difficulty’ in applying the Second Amendment’s
individual right” view to the states.  Cameron Desmond, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Impli-
cations of an Individual Right to Bear Arms on the Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MC-
GEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1051 (2008) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second
Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 296 (2000)).
209. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed by Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 167, 186–87 (2008) (explaining that like the
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V. CONCLUSION
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court of the United
States considered whether the District of Columbia violated the Sec-
ond Amendment by prohibiting District residents from possessing usa-
ble handguns in their homes.210  The Court held that the ban on
handgun possession and the prohibition on operable firearm posses-
sion in the home violated the Second Amendment.211  In so holding,
the Court erred by not specifying that strict scrutiny should be the
default standard of review for regulations challenged under the Sec-
ond Amendment, unless it later decides to carve out certain excep-
tions to which a more deferential standard should apply.212 Had the
Court explicitly applied a strict scrutiny standard to the statutes at
hand, it likely could have reached the same outcome without leaving
lower courts confused as to what standard to apply in the future.213
multi-level system of review used in free speech cases, different Second Amendment tests
could be applied in different settings).
210. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 2821–22.
212. See supra Part IV.A.
213. See supra Part IV.B.
